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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A defendant in the position of Addam Swapp, is entitled to a 
concise statement of what is claimed he did to commit one or all 
of the three subdivisions of the statute and the obligation to 
provide such is not met by a probable cause statement or a 
memorandum on accomplice liability. 
A defendant is entitled to the benefit of a sentencing 
statute limiting the imposition of consecutive sentences where said 
statute is unambiguous. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH * 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT * CASE NO.89-0087-CA 
V. * 
ADDAM SWAPP * CATEGORY NO. 2 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
POINT ONE 
I BILL OF PARTICULARS 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State takes the position that 
State v Bell 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988), may mandate a bill of 
particulars when the Information merely repeats verbatim, the 
broad language of the statute. (Brief of Appellee p.21). 
Such is the circumstance in the case at bar. 
However, the State distinguishes the Bel 1 situation from 
the case before the Court because the Information in our case was 
accompanied by: 
1. An Affidavit of Probable Cause and, 
2. A Memorandum filed in response to defendants Motion for 
Bill of Particulars which set forth various principles of 
accomplice liability and legal causation. (Both appear as Addendum 
1 
2A and B respectfully in Brief of Appellee). 
(A) AFFIDAVIT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE FOR INFORMATION 
This document is twelve pages long, and the only section of 
it speaks to the offense charged and what the defendant did to 
commit the offense is the one half page paragraph 26 which merely 
recites verbatim the statute (U.C.A. 76-5-203) which the appellant 
claims is insufficient. This appellant cannot conceive of how this 
meets the Bel 1 requirement of a short and concise statement of what 
a defendant is charged. 
The "Affidavit of Probable Cause" however, has more serious 
shortcomings if its use is to obviate the need for a bill of 
particulars. U.C.A.77-35-4(b) states: 
An indictment of information shall charge the offense for 
which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name 
given to the offense by common law, or by statute, or by 
stating in concise terms the definition of the offense 
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. 
An information may contain or be accompanied by a 
statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. 
That statute does not make the filing of a statement of 
Probable Cause mandatory. It should be read in connection with 
subsection (a) of 77-35-4 which requires an Information to be 
sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. The purpose of the Probable Cause Statement is to meet 
the requirements of attestation of the Information. The problem 
is that the defendant cannot legitimatley rely upon the probable 
cause statement even if it were to contain a specific and complete 
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list of theories and means by which a defendant committed a certain 
act. The defendant cannot rely upon it because it is not part of 
the Information except in the sense of fulfilling the attestation 
requirement. Could the defendant at the trial, be heard to 
complain, if the evidence was different than the Affidavit, or was 
not included in the Affidavit? 
Prior to trial, a defendant might be able to mount a creative 
attack upon an Information on the grounds that there was 
insufficient probable cause as contained in the probable cause 
statement for its issuance by the use of authority from other 
jurisdictions, however the issue would be thusly limited. 
There is a long line of authority in Utah prior to Bel 1 for 
the proposition that merely restating a statute in an Information 
or Complaint may not be sufficient in circumstances where a concise 
statement of the charges is needed. In rejecting the statutory 
language as sufficient State v. Hale, 71 Utah 134, 263 P.86 the 
Court stated the following at 71 Utah 141, and 142: 
The sufficiency of the language used in an information 
to charge a public offense is not necessarily determined 
by whether such language is or is not the language used 
in the statute defining the offense sought to be charged... 
That is to say, if the statute creating and defining the 
act condemned meets the requirements of sections 8830, and 
8832, supra, then an information charging the offense in 
the language of the statute is good pleading; but, if such 
statutory language is so general in its terms as not to 
meet the requirements of those sections, proper pleading 
requires that the information go further in stating the 
offense than to merely use the language of the statute. 
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STATE v. HALE, SUPRA, is an important case for the appellant 
in another perspective as well. On page 141 of 71 Utah, the Court 
concerns itself with the kind of questions which Addam Swapp needs 
answered prior to his trial and a sample of which are contained in 
Appellant's opening brief. In Hale, the Court listed the important 
questions not answered by merely reciting the words of the statute. 
In the case at bar, not only did the verbatim recitation of the 
statute leave the defendant unaware of what acts he did to commit 
murder but it was worded in all the alternative ways of the statute 
compounding the dilemma of the defendant. 
Another Utah case discussing how circumstances of particular 
cases render a charge in the words of the Statute inadequate is 
State v. Swan, 31 Utah 336, 88 P. 12. The Court engages in an en-
lightening discussion at 31 Utah 342 to 343. In citing State v. 
Mckenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815, the Court considered in dicta that 
a charge which would confuse a defendant even though statutorily 
pled is deficient, and charges should be pled to lead to clarity. 
The appellant contends that he was charged by use of the 
statutory language, without a statement of particular facts and in 
the alternative to maximize the State's chances at trial and to 
minimize the appellants ability to mount a defense because he 
does not know what facts to rebut or which theory of murder to 
contest. It is the unusual nature of the circumstances in the 
case which render it of particular importance that the defendant 
know of what he is accused. There were almost two weeks of 
activities during the siege, and three defendants, and because 
4 
there was no allegation that Addam Swapp shot the victim or 
encouraged or planned the shooting, he should be afforded the right 
to know what he did during the siege to constitute one or all of 
the three theories of murder charged. 
(B) MEMORANDA OF STATE CONCERNING ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND 
ADMISSABILITY OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
The State contends in its brief that a Bill of Particulars is 
obviated in this case by whole or in part because of a memorandum 
filed regarding accomplice liability (see Addendum "C" of 
Appellee's Brief). 
The appellant urges that the legal effect of the Memorandum 
is nil even assuming arguendo that it were specific or concise 
enough to serve as a plain statement of the charges. But it is not 
specific or concise. It is a list of cases from mostly other 
jurisdictions concerning general principals of accomplice, 
liability, and causation. If the State were to have designated a 
particular case with the same facts as the case at bar, and claimed 
this is the factual pattern we claim Addam Swapp did to commit the 
crime, and how that factual pattern equates to the murder as 
charged, then the appellant would not have grounds to complain. 
However, that is absurd to believe it could occur and in fact did 
not occur. It's almost the same as a defendant asking what he did 
to commit second degree murder and the prosecutor telling him to 
read the murder section of Perkins on Criminal Law. 
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POINT II 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
The state has attempted in its argument to distinguish the 
plain reading of Utah Code Annotated 76-30-401 (5) (c) by the use 
of the advisory precedent of People v. Dye, 69 111.2nd 298, 371 
N.E 2d 630 (1977). 
The appellant urges the use of that case, even if controlling, 
is troublesome. In Dye, the Illinois statute at issue, 111. 
Revised Statutes ch 38, 1005-8-4 (c) requires the Court to make 
two findings. First, it must calculate what twice the lowest 
minimum term is, then second, it must determine what is the most 
serious felony. 
A Utah sentencing Court need not make and should not make a 
finding of what twice the lowest minimum term is because the 
statute at issue (U.C.A 76-3-401) was not concerned with that 
calculation. The Illinois Court in Dye had a statute that would 
lead to the situation in Dve at 634 where the Court would be pro-
hibited from imposing a consecutive sentence if the determinate 
sentence was greater than two years and Illinois offense was less 
that a Class 1 felony. 
The State argues that the Illinois situation is applicable. 
However, the Utah Statute is plainly a limitation on all sentences. 
It mentions aggregate minimums because this state and others have 
minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment but it, unlike Illinois, 
makes special mention that the limitation applies to federal 
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sentences in subsection 5(c). There is no ambiguity and the Court 
is not faced with the irregularity referred to above and at Dye, 
634. That is, the Utah statute not only mentions a specific year 
limitation and application but it calls for a specific limitation 
on all sentences without the need to calculate anything but the 
total minimum years and maximum years. 
The Court should be advised that subsequent to the filing of 
the original briefs herein the Tenth Circuit of Appeals remanded 
Addam Swapp case back to the District of Utah for re-sentencing to 
an additional 5 years. Said decision is attached hereto as an 
addendum. 
CONCLUSION 
A defendant in the circumstances of Addam Swapp has the right 
to a plain and concise statement of the allegations of fact he did 
to commit one or all of the three alternate theories and such is 
not provided by a verbatim recitation of the three statutary 
theories in the Information. 
The defendant should not have been given consecutive sentences 
in derogation of the unambiguous statute U.C.A. 76-3-401 
Dated this 31st day of October, 1990/. 
'R. Bucher, 
tytorney for Appellant 
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"ADDENDUM" 
F I L E D 
Uniced States Court of Appeals 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 
TENTH CIRCUIT SEP 2 0 1990 
ROBERT L HOECKER 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JONATHAN SWAPP and 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
and 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
ADDAM SWAPP, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Cross-Appellee, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 
Before TACHA, BARRETT and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 
In these consolidated appeals we review the convictions of 
co-defendants Addam Swapp (Addam), Jonathan Swapp (Jonathan), and 
John Timothy Singer (Timothy). A fourth co-defendant, Vickie 
This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 
be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 
for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
Nos. 88-2433 and 
88-2435 
(D.C. Nos. 88CR-006-03J 
and 88CR-006-04J) 
(Dist. of Utah) 
Nos. 88-2516, 89-4090 
and 89-4095 
(D.C. No. 88CR-006-01J) 
(Dist. of Utah) 
Singer (Vickie), mother of Timothy and mother-in-law of Addam, 
appealed, but that appeal was later voluntarily dismissed. The 
government cross-appeals, challenging Addam's sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) . 
Background 
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, a stake house 
owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints at 
Marion, Utah, was extensively damaged when a dynamite device 
exploded inside it. Addam admitted that he had created the 
device, placed it in the building, and set it to explode. After 
setting the device, Addam returned to the Singer property located 
approximately one mile east of the stake house where he observed 
the explosion with others residing at the property. Addam resided 
at the property with his wives, Vickie's daughters (Charlotte and 
Heidi), Jonathan, Vickie, Timothy, and six children. 
After an initial investigation of the stake house, which 
included observing several sets of footprints to and from the 
stake house to the Singer property, federal agents initiated two 
phone calls to the Singer residence and spoke with Addam and 
Vickie. The calls were made to assess the needs of the families 
and to determine if there were any hostages. Addam related that 
he had expected the call. Both Addam and Vickie quoted extensively 
from the Old Testament and indicated that all of the events had 
been revealed to them by God. Both refused to leave the property. 
During the course of the following thirteen days, law 
enforcement agents (agents or officers) surrounded the Singer 
property. Jiigh.-intensity lights and high powered speakers were 
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set up around the property. The agents played loud noises over 
the speaker systems and deployed flares in the area of the 
property in an effort to force the defendants and other 
inhabitants to leave the property. Shots were fired at the lights 
and speakers from Vickie's house. Throughout the thirteen-day 
period, Jonathan and Addam were observed walking around the 
property with rifles. Several agents testified that Addam and 
Jonathan pointed their rifles at them. 
The officers attempted to negotiate with the defendants 
through Roger Bates, Timothy's brother-in-law, and Ogden Kraut, a 
friend of the family. After Bates visited with the defendants, he 
related to the agents that none of the defendants or other 
occupants of the house wanted to leave. The officers subsequently 
dropped a letter (from a helicopter) to the defendants. The 
letter indicated that Addam and Vickie had been indicted by a 
grand jury for the bombing of the stake house and that there were 
outstanding arrest warrants for both of them. The letter 
encouraged the family to surrender peacefully. 
Thereafter, Kraut offered to act as an intermediary. During 
his first visit with the family, Addam told Kraut that they were 
expecting John Singer (Vickie's deceased husband) to be resur-
rected from the dead as a result of their confrontation with the 
authorities. During his second visit with the family, Kraut 
delivered a letter from Utah's Governor Bangerter urging the 
family to surrender peacefully. During his third visit, Kraut 
picked up two letters from Addam and Vickie to Governor 
Bangerter. 
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Within his letter to Governor Bangerter, Addam stated, inter 
alia, that: he did not recognize the governor as having any 
authority or jurisdiction over him or his family; the most hideous 
murderers in this country are the judges, lawyers and doctors; 
John Singer was murdered by the church and government of Utah; and 
"we the people on this property are now a nation under God—and 
are independent and separate from your wicked society of ever 
changing laws and dark councils . . . ." (R./ Vol. XII at p. 
781). 
Within her letter to Governor Bangerter, Vickie stated, inter 
alia; "I am John Singer's faithful wife. Prophet of God was 
persecuted and martyred because he would not compromise the truths 
of Heaven . . . . We will not give ourselves under the hands of 
the authorities. They will not take our children for they are an 
heritage of the Lord and they are children of Zion, the covenant 
children of the Lord with a promise and the world can't give them 
anything better than what the Lord has promised." (R., Vol. XII at 
pp. 775^77). 
The agents subsequently determined that it would be best to 
attempt to arrest Addam on the belief that if Addam were captured, 
the other family members would surrender. A plan was developed 
which included using trained dogs to subdue Addam. Early on 
January 28, 1988, Adam and Jonathan, both of whom were armed, left 
the Singer home to milk a goat. After they finished milking and 
began walking from the goat pen back to the Singer home, the 
agents released two dogs. Before the dogs could reach Addam and 
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Jonathan, three shots were fired from the Singer house. One shot 
killed Lt. Fred House, a dog handler, instantly. 
When the shots were fired, Addam pulled his rifle off his 
shoulder and brought it into firing position. Two agents fired at 
Addam. One bullet hit Addam's wrist, traveled into his chest and 
lodged in his back. Additional shots were fired from the Singer 
residence. Although a bullet struck FBI Agent Don Roberts in 
the chest, he escaped injury when the bullet was deflected by his 
bullet-proof vest. Addam surrendered a few minutes later and 
shortly thereafter the entire family surrendered. 
Timothy was taken into custody and transported to Salt Lake 
City by two federal agents. During the trip, Timothy gave a 
lengthy oral statement. He stated, inter alia, that: the church 
was blown up because no one was listening or cared about the death 
of his father (John Singer); he believed it was a revelation from 
the Lord for the church to be blown up; after the church bombing 
they knew there were a lot of officers surrounding their home 
because they had seen the reports on television; he did not 
surrender because to have done so would have meant that he did not 
believe in the Lord; he had fired ten shots from the Singer house 
at the dogs but did not know if he hit them; and he did not need 
to be a marksman because the Lord guided him. (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 
1602-06) . 
Addam, Jonathan, Timothy and Vickie were subsequently charged 
in an eight-count amended superseding indictment. The eight 
counts and those charged thereunder were: I, knowingly and 
maliciously damaging and attempting to damage a building with an 
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explosive (Addam and Vickie); II, use of a deadly and dangerous 
weapon (a bomb) in relation to Count I (Addam and Vickie); III, 
attempting to kill officers and employees of the FBI (Addam, 
Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); IV, use of a deadly and dangerous 
weapon in relation to Count III (Addam, Jonathan, Timothy, 
Vickie); V, assaulting, resisting, impeding, intimidating and 
interfering with officers and employees of the FBI while said 
employees and officers were engaged in the performance of their 
official duties (Adam, Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); VI, use of a 
deadly and dangerous weapon, i.e., a firearm, in relation to Count 
V (Addam, Jonathan, Timothy, Vickie); VII, knowingly possessing 
and aiding and abetting in the possession of a destructive device 
(a bomb) that had not been registered (Addam, Vickie); VIII, know-
ingly possessing and aiding and abetting in the possession of a 
destructive device (a sawed-off shotgun) that had not been 
registered (Vickie). 
At trial, the government presented detailed evidence relative 
to the bombing of the stake house, the thirteen days following the 
bombing, attempts to persuade the defendants and other family 
members to surrender peaceably, and the arrests of the defendants. 
The government's evidence included testimony relative to Timothy's 
comments to two agents during his transfer to Salt Lake City 
following his arrest; the twenty-three weapons (handguns, 
shotguns, and rifles) and 8,304 rounds of ammunition seized from 
the Singer home and property; and statements of a ballistics 
expert relative to three rifle shots from a position near the 
place that Jonathan was observed kneeling and shouldering his 
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weapon, and the recovery of seven projectiles which had been fired 
from the rifle which Timothy admitted using on the morning of 
January 28, 1988, including a projectile which hit Lt. House. 
Addam was the only defendant to testify. Before Addam testi-
fied, his counsel and the court voir dired Addam extensively (out 
of the presence of the jury) relative to his desire to testify, 
his right not to testify, and the effect thereof. This examina-
tion included the following colloquy; 
Q. (Defense Counsel) You understand the nature of 
the proceedings here today? 
A. (Addam Swapp) Yes, I do. 
Q. And the consequences of your action and the 
possible imprisonment that you may have? 
A. I understand more than you give me credit for 
at this time. 
• • * 
The Court: You're conscious of the choices that 
are available. 
The Witness: Yes, I am. 
The Court: And you understand that you can stand 
mute, remain silent, say nothing and simply put the 
United States to its proof? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: You've considered the alternatives not 
only with your attorneys but with those who are close to 
you? 
The Witness: Yes. I have discussed it with each 
one of the other defendants in great length. Their at-
torneys are quite opposed to it, but Timothy, Jonathan, 
and Vickie are all one hundred percent behind me. 
(R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1867-69). 
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During his testimony, Addam admitted that he bombed the stake 
house. Addam also testified, inter alia, that: in bombing the 
stake house he did not make an effort to hurt or physically harm 
any person; after the bombing they listened to the mobilization of 
the law enforcement officials over a bearcat scanner which they had 
set to the frequencies of the sheriff, highway patrol, and local 
police department; they had no thoughts of surrendering peacefully 
because "this people" (law enforcement officials) had proven to be 
their known enemies; they had received notification from the law 
enforcement agents to surrender peacefully; he attempted to disable 
the lights and speakers erected around the property because they 
tortured him and the others in the house; he never aimed at or 
tried to shoot any of the law enforcement officials although he had 
plenty of chances; and he knew the siege was over after he had been 
shot. (R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1870-79). 
During cross-examination, Addam repeatedly refused to comply 
with the orders of the court to answer the questions of the 
prosecutor. Addam did testify, inter alia, that: he designed the 
bomb which was comprised of 87 sticks of dynamite and 50 pounds of 
prill ("like fertilizer"); the bomb weighed between 130 and 140 
pounds; the truth was within him but it was not for the 
prosecutor's ears nor was it for the rest of the prosecution (in 
response to who went with him to bomb the stake house); when the 
bomb went 'off, it looked as if many evil spirits were rising above 
the chapel; the bombing of the stake house was just the beginning 
of the destruction of the church, state, and nation; God had told 
him to stand and fight like a man; he called KUTV on the morning of 
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the bombing and gave a statement in which he related that the 
Singer property was the last place where God had established a 
stronghold of the daughter of Zion and that they would not 
compromise; he and the other defendants had taken a "stand" 
("[i]t's something that burns within all four of us.") (R./ Vol. 
XIV, p. 1901) not to compromise; he had approximately twenty guns 
in Vickie's home during the thirteen days in question; some of 
weapons in the house included sawed off shotguns which he had 
"sawed off" himself; most of the weapons were assembled in 
Vickie's house on January 15 and 16, 1988, and that he owned the 
weapons; he had fired numerous shots from the house during the 
thirteen days in question; he never fired at the speakers when the 
officers were nearby; in his letter to Governor Bangerter he had 
related that any man crossing the boundary of his property would be 
treated as an aggressor and that it did not matter if the person 
had a warrant for his arrest because he did not recognize such 
warrants; he had declared the Singer compound a sovereign nation; 
no one ever shot at him or his family while they were out walking 
around on the property during the thirteen days; and although he 
heard news reports indicating that the law enforcement authorities 
wanted a peaceful solution, he couldn't believe it. (R., Vol. XIV, 
pp. 1891-1932). 
In response to several questions whether he and Jonathan or 
Timothy had engaged in certain activity, Addam responded, "I stand 
mute. If you want to know, ask him." (R., Vol. XIV. at pp. 1912, 
1914, 1915). Defense counsel did not object to these questions. 
However, when the prosecutor inquired of Addam whether he had 
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talked with Timothy about the need for a larger caliber gun, 
Addam's counsel objected and the court responded that ,f[w]e'll 
strike that and we'll indicate to the jury that they should ignore 
all of such responses here." (R., Vol. XIV, p. 1916). 
During cross examination, the prosecutor asked Addam to 
explain his statement to a reporter that it was "the shot heard 
around the world". (R., Vol. XIV, p. 1933). Addam responded, "The 
bombing of the church. It was compared to the shot heard around 
the world." Ici. The prosecutor inquired further as to whether his 
statement concerned the death of Officer House. Addam's counsel 
objected. The court sustained the objection and admonished the 
jury to forget the question. Id. 
On May 9, 1988, the jury returned its verdicts against the 
four co-defendants, finding: Addam guilty on Counts I, II, IV, V, 
VI, and VII, and as to Count III, guilty of attempted murder in the 
second degree; Vickie guilty on Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII; 
Jonathan guilty on Counts IV, V, and VI, and as to Count III, 
guilty of attempted murder in the second degree; Timothy guilty on 
Counts IV, V, and VI, and as to Count III, guilty of attempted 
murder in the second degree. 
Contentions on Appeal 
a. 
Addam contends that the district court erred in: (1) denying 
his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (2) 
denying him the right to interrogate a juror; and (3) denying his 
motion for a new trial based on comments made by Vickie's defense 
counsel. 
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( i - ) 
During the government's case, detailed evidence was presented 
that to Lt. House was struck by a bullet fired from a rifle which 
Timothy had acknowledged using, that House was rendered unconscious 
and had gone into cardiac arrest, and that House had received 
emergency treatment and was thereafter taken to a hospital. (R., 
Vol. XII, pp. 853, 856, 859, 944, 961-65, 979-82, 988, 1014, 1026, 
1047, 1083; Vol. XIII, pp. 1088, 1093, 1121, 1131). 
Near the end of the trial, the court ruled that additional 
comment on Lt. House would not be permitted. In so doing the court 
noted: 
The Court: Now there isn't a count relating to 
Fred House. Fred House is simply not part of this 
indictment. 
[T]he fact that Fred House died is simply ir-
relevant . . . . 
You can separate it, and we're through talking 
about Lt. House in this courtroom. The prejudicial 
effect other than what's in the record already is of 
such a nature as to render, it seems to me, the 
probative value far less than it should be. 
(R., Vol. XIV at pp. 1769, 1771). 
Notwithstanding these admonitions, the prosecutor did comment 
on Lt. House's death while cross-examining Addam: 
Q. (Prosecutor) Now, Mr. Swapp, you told Mr. Wagner, did 
you not, the Tribune reporter, that you considered a 
shot to be the shot heard around the world, didn't you? 
A. (Addam) Yes. 
Q. What shot was that? 
-11-
A. The bombing of the church. It was compared to the 
shot heard around the world. 
Q. Isn't it true that the conversation which you made 
that statement concerned the death of Officer House? 
MR. BUCHER: Objection, Your Honor. 
MR. METOS: I'll object. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection and I'll strike 
the question, admonish the jury to forget the question. 
And counsel should direct his questions in an 
appropriate fashion. Put your next question. 
(R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1933-34). 
Addam argues that the prosecutor's question was particularly 
prejudicial with respect to Count III (attempting to kill officers 
and employees of the FBI) because none of the officers testified 
that he (Addam) fired his weapon or that he (Addam) requested any 
member of his family to fire on the officers. Addam argues that 
this question, when taken in context with the other questions 
propounded to him during cross-examination, was irrelevant and 
inflammatory and that the combined effect was so prejudicial that 
no limiting instruction could cure it. 
The government responds that the question did not assume or 
imply that Addam was responsible for House's death; Addam had 
previously testified during direct examination that he had not 
aimed at or attempted to shoot anyone on January 28, 1988; the 
question was relevant in establishing Addam's intent; without the 
armed defiance of Addam, Jonathan, and Timothy, there would have 
been no bloodshed, forcible resistance, or attempted murder; and, 
if the question constituted error, it was harmless error which was 
not sufficient to influence the jury in any appreciable way. 
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Prosecutorial misconduct is not per se reversible error. 
United States y^ Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1988), 
Quoting United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 
1986), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987). We follow the general 
rule that not all misconduct requires reversal; it is only when 
such conduct can be said to have influenced the verdict that it 
becomes prejudicial. Id. It is the duty of the reviewing court 
to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that 
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, including most of those 
involving constitutional violations, United States v. Kornegay, 
885 F. 2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, U.S. 
(1990), citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
Applying these standards, we hold that the question did not give 
rise to reversible error. 
Prior to this question, the government had presented detailed 
evidence, without objection, establishing that Lt. House had been 
struck by a bullet fired from the Singer house, that he fell to 
the floor unconscious, went into cardiac arrest and was 
subsequently taken to the hospital. Moreover, prior to the 
question, Addam had testified that; he had bombed the stake 
center; they had no thoughts of surrendering peacefully because 
the law enforcement agents were their "known enemies;" the bombing 
of the stake house was just the beginning of the destruction of 
the church, state and nation; he had approximately twenty guns in 
Vickie's house during the thirteen days in question; most of the 
weapons were assembled in Vickie's house on January 15 and 16, 
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1988, and he owned all the weapons; and he had declared the Singer 
property a sovereign nation. 
When asked what the statement meant, Addam responded that it 
referred to the bombing of the church. The prosecutor's subsequent 
inquiry as to whether the statement concerned the death of Lt. 
House was argumentative and improper. It was objected to and the 
court immediately instructed the jury to ignore the question. The 
record fails to establish that Addam was prejudiced by the 
question. The totality of the government's evidence was strong. 
Where the evidence against the accused is strong, the appellant 
must show that the prejudice he claims constitutes plain error. 
United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cert, 
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 
(10th Cir. 1969). 
(ii.) 
Addam contends that that court erred in disallowing him 
"leave to interrogate a jury who may have been influenced by 
extraneous matter and not granting a mistrial on that basis." 
(Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p. 18.) 
On August 30, 1988, Ronald Miller, a criminal investigator 
for the Utah Attorney General's Office executed an affadavit in 
which he stated that juror Fred Lacey had "done some research on 
his own" the weekend before the jury returned its verdicts. Addam 
filed a motion for a mistrial based on the affidavit. Two days 
later the court held a special hearing for the purpose of 
questioning Lacey: 
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THE COURT: MR. LACEY, let me ask you rather 
directly: Did you talk with anyone about this case 
during the days that the jury was deliberating, other 
than your fellow Jurors? 
JUROR LACEY: No, I did not. 
THE COURT: And let me ask you: Did you look at 
any material relating to this case during the days that 
the Jury was deliberating, other than that presented in 
evidence? 
JUROR LACEY: I did not. 
(R., Vol. XV at p. 5) 
Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred between the court 
and Addam's counsel: 
THE COURT: What are you going to do with your 
Motion. Are you withdrawing your Motion? 
MR BUCHER: I'm withdrawing my Motion. The Motion 
was filed after I read the Affidavit,— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BUCHER: — and in order to call it for an 
Evidentiary Hearing in what we've just done in this 
matter. So it's mooted; or it's not mooted, but it's 
groundless. 
(R.f Vol. XV at p. 9.) 
Counsel for Addam subsequently filed a motion for new trial 
and evidentiary hearing based on his allegations that "it has come 
to the attention of counsel, that one, or more jury members may 
have been exposed to extraneous and prejudicial material during or 
before their deliberations". (R., Vol. VI, Tab 387, p. 1). No 
evidence or facts were proffered to support the motion. The court 
denied the motion finding that "the defendant has not even made a 
sufficient preliminary showing to justify further inquiry into 
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possible extrinsic influences on the jury in this case"* Id. at 
p. 2. 
On appeal Addam does not challenge the court's finding that 
he failed to make "a sufficient preliminary showing to justify 
further inquiry." Rather, Addam argues only that the court did 
not allow an extensive examination of the juror. 
A trial court has a great responsibility and wide discretion 
in dealing with a motion for new trial based on allegations of 
juror misconduct. United States v. Bradshaw, 787 P.2d 1385, 1390 
(10th Cir. 1986), quoting United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 
1173 (10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983). 
Something more than unverified conjecture is necessary to justify 
the grant of a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct where 
only potentially suspicious circumstances are shown; the trial 
court's decision will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. 
Id. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Addam's motion. 
(iii.) 
Addam contends that the court erred in denying his motion for 
a new trial based on the comments of Vickie's defense counsel that 
Addam was responsible for acts of vandalism in the neighborhood of 
Marion, Utah, prior to October 1987. 
During the closing arguments, counsel for Vickie stated: 
For all Vickie Singer knows, Addam was planning to 
erect the red pole on the Main Street of the town and 
perhaps leave some additional signs or grafitti to at-
tract attention to the anniversary of John Singer's 
death. After all, he had been doing this type of thing 
before October 29th. 
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(Tr. Final Argument, p. 118, lines 18-22). 
Addam did not object to the remarks. On appeal, Addam 
contends that the comments, "together with the damaging affect 
[sic] of the prejudicial cross-examination of Addam Swapp 
put the burden of the whole incident with Addam Swapp." (Opening 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p.21). 
The government responds that under Rule 52(b), Fed. R. Crim. 
P., "plain error or defects effecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court;" Addam did not object to the comments at the time they were 
made; and that unless Addam can demonstrate that the comments 
constituted plain error, the court's denial of his motion for new 
trial on this ground must stand. 
In analyzing the plain error doctrine under Rule 52(b) in 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985), the Supreme Court 
opined: 
The plain-error doctrine of Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 52(b) tempers the blow of a rigid 
application of the contemporaneous-objection require-
ment. The Rule authorizes the Court of Appeals to cor-
rect only 'particularly egregious errors' . . . those 
errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings'. . . . In 
other words, the plain-error exception to the 
contemporaneous-objection rule is to be 'used sparingly, 
solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of 
justice would otherwise result.' 
Applying this standard to the facts herein, we hold that the 
court did not err in denying Addams' motion for a new trial based on 
the comments of Vickie's counsel. The evidence of Addam's guilt was 
overwhelming. We are unable to ascertain how, under any conditions, 
the comments first objected to on appeal could be considered 
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"particularly egregious" or errors which would "seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." On 
the contrary, it is more likely that the jury paid as little 
attention to the comments as did Addam's trial counsel. 
b. 
Jonathan contends that the court erred in: (1) failing to 
order further psychological evaluation before declaring him competent 
to stand trial; (2) admitting extrajudicial statements of Vickie and 
failing to grant his motion to sever; and (3) denying his motion for a 
mistrial. 
(i.) 
Prior to trial, Jonathan's defense counsel filed several 
motions which raised the issue of Jonathan's ability and competency to 
stand trial. Jonathan vehemently opposed the motions. Thereafter, 
Dr. Groesbeck, a psychiatrist, was retained to examine Jonathan. 
Jonathan was examined for approximately four and one-half hours over 
the course of two days. A competency hearing was later held during 
which Dr. Groesbeck testified that Jonathan was incompetent to stand 
trial. (R., Vol. IX, p.398). 
After Dr. Groesbeck testified, the court allowed Jonathan to 
personally respond. During his response Jonathan testified that he 
felt he deserved the opportunity to be examined by another 
psychiatrist; he understood fully what "is going on here" and the 
implications; he understood what could and might happen to him; he had 
the right to stand and face the charges against him; Dr. Groesbeck did 
not have the right to say, based on his (Jonathan's) religion, that he 
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(Jonathan) was mentally ill; just because a man has faith and believes 
in God does not mean that he is crazy or does not understand; and Dr. 
Groesbeck was taking his (Jonathan's) religion and twisting it into a 
mental illness. 
After hearing and considering all of the evidence, the court 
found Jonathan competent to stand trial. In so doing, the court 
found, inter alia: 
[T]he court is satisfied as to the ability of the young 
man to be of assistance in his own defense. The court 
is in a position to observe, to interrogate, and while 
giving some interested deference to the material that 
you presented, the fact that one understands what one is 
doing and manifests that with what appears to be 
adequate recognition as to consequences, and even though 
one may disagree with those who are in a position to 
advise him, the fact that he may disagree and fail to 
follow suggestions in and of itself, in my opinion, 
doesn't rise to the level of the status that you suggest 
it might . . . I think under the circumstances there's 
an adequate manifestation as to an understanding as to, 
one, the charges. Two, the consequences. And three, 
perhaps some basic disagreement as to the manner in 
which particular items ought to be treated. 
(R., Vol. IX at pp. 528-529). 
Where the district court has held a hearing and thereafter 
found that a defendant is competent to stand trial, that finding 
will not be set aside unless it is determined to be clearly 
erroneous or arbitrary. United States v. Crews
 f 781 F.2d 826, 833 
(10th Cir. 1986) . 
Jonathan's responses to the court were clear, direct, and to 
the point. Moreover, Dr. Groesbeck acknowledged that Jonathan 
functioned fairly well with respect to his ability to record, 
recall, and relate. Dr. Groesbeck also testified that "in terms of 
memory and ordinary day-to-day activities I think he functions 
quite well. In fact I think that he's super sensitive." (R., 
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Vol. IX at p. 416). Under these circumstances, we hold that the 
court's finding that Jonathan was competent to stand trial was not 
clearly erroneous or arbitrary. 
(ii.) 
Jonathan contends that the court erred in admitting 
extrajudicial statements of Addam and Vickie and that the 
admission of the statements violated his constitutional right of 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. In particular, Jonathan 
challenges the admission of Vickie's statement to Doug Palmer, a 
newspaper reporter, and Addam's statement to Charles Gibbs, an 
editor with KUTBV. 
During her conversation with Doug Palmer, Vickie related: 
We are not going to make peace with them. We will not 
surrender. We've gone beyond talk. We are going into 
battle. This is serious . . . . I have talked my guts 
out for years. Talking is over with. We're going into 
battle. Yes, there will be death, killing. Nothing we 
can do but protect ourselves. The Lord means what he 
says. 
(R., Vol. XI, p. 425). 
During his conversation with Charles Gibbs, Addam 
related: 
We are making a stand against this corruption and 
wickedness. Our liberties and our God given rights have 
been tramped on long enough . . . . The stand that we 
are making is greater than the stand of the signers , of 
the Declaration of Independence. The Lord has given a 
commandment that we should stand and fight manfully, and 
we have been assured that the Lord will fight our 
battles....[w]e will be victorious. These people will 
not believe their eyes. 
(R., Vol. XI, pp. 451-452). 
-20-
Jonathan argues that inasmuch as both statements used the 
terms "we," "our" and "us," the jury could reasonably infer that 
Addam and Vickie were talking about, representing, and describing 
the acts of all the defendants. This, according to Jonathan, al-
lowed the jury to infer that he had concurred in and participated 
"in the incriminating actions expressed in the co-defendants' 
statements," in violation of his constitutional right of 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, (Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 26). The government responds that Jonathan's 
constitutional rights were not violated when, as here, Addam 
testified and was available for cross-examination, the statements 
of Addam and Vickie did not directly refer to or inculpate 
Jonathan, and much of Jonathan's criminal conduct occurred after 
the statements were made. 
Both parties rely on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968) and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In Bruton, a 
non-testifying co-defendant's confession inculpating the defendant 
was admitted into evidence in a joint trial. The trial court 
instructed the jury to disregard the confession in determining the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court held that the 
admission of "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements" 
violated the defendant's right of cross-examination under the 
Sixth Amendment. 391 U.S. at p. 135. In so holding, the Court 
recognized, however: 
Not every admission of inadmissable hearsay or other 
evidence can be considered to be reversible error 
unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances 
occur in almost every trial where inadmissable evidence 
creeps in, usually inadvertently. 'A defendant is 
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.' It is 
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not unreasonable to conclude that in many cases they 
jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions 
to disregard such information. (Citations omitted). 
Id. 
Bruton is applied only where the extrajudicial comments are 
"clearly inculpatory as to the complaining co-defendants and [are] 
vitally important to the government's case." United States v. 
Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1399 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 474 
U.S. 1023 (1985). Bruton was clarified in Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), where the Court held that "the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 
instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate 
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her 
existence." 
Applying Bruton and Richardson to the case at bar, we hold 
that the admission of the statements was not in violation of 
Jonathan's rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. Initially, the court instructed the jury (prior to the 
receipt of the statements) that the statements were to be 
considered only in reference to Vickie and Addam. (R., Vol. XI, 
pp. 421 and 450). Neither statement was a confession. Neither 
statement made any reference to Jonathan's name or existence. 
Moreover the statements were not "vitally important to the 
government's case" against Jonathan. Rather, the statements were 
no more than pronouncements of Addam's and Vickie's personal and 
religious beliefs. 
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Included within Jonathan's argument that Addam's and Vickie's 
statements violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation clause, is his contention that the cumulative impact 
of Addam's and Vickie's statements justified his severance motion 
and that the court erred in denying it. Severance is justified 
only in extreme cases. United States v. Rogers,, 899 F.2d 917, 926 
(10th Cir. 1990). A trial court's decision to deny a motion for 
severance will not be disturbed on appeal absent an affirmative 
showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 897 
F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1990). This is not an extreme case 
warranting severance and Jonathan has failed to make an 
affirmative showing that the court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a severance. 
(iii.) 
Jonathan contends that the court erred in denying his motions 
for a mistrial based on Addam's comments. As set forth supra, 
Addam was the only defendant who testified. During the course of 
cross-examination, Addam refused to answer several questions 
about whether he and Jonathan or Timothy had engaged in certain 
activities. (R., Vol XIV, pp. 1912, 1914-15). Addam also 
suggested, in response to several questions, that the prosecutor 
should ask the co-defendants, including Jonathan, directly about 
their involvement. Addam further testified that he had discussed 
taking "a stand" with all the defendants and that "[i]t's 
something that burns within all four of us." (R., Vol XIV, p. 
1901). 
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Jonathan argues that Addam's responses and testimony amounted 
to impermissible comments on his decision not to testify and 
that the appropriate "remedy to cure a constitutional violation of 
this magnitude is reversal." (Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 
31). 
The government responds that Addam's testimony did not give 
rise to a violation of Jonathan's decision not to testify, that 
Addam did not attempt to blame Jonathan for any wrongdoing, and 
that there was no comment by Addam, the prosecution, or anyone 
else relative to Jonathan's decision not to testify. We agree. 
The assertion "of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'is properly 
no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences 
whatever can be legitimately drawn from them from the legal 
assertion by the witness of his constitutional right.'" United 
States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 491 (10th Cir. 1984), quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196 (1943). The Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against commenting to the jury upon the 
defendant's decision not to testify is violated only when "the 
language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character 
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 
comment on the failure of the accused to testify." United States 
v. Gomez-Olivas. 897 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1990), quoting 
Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955). 
Moreover, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect 
one. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953). 
Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 
Addam's comments and responses can not be considered or construed 
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as impermissible comments on Jonathan's decision not to testify. 
None of Addam's responses and comments ''would naturally and 
necessarily. . . [be interpreted by the jury as a] comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify. •' 
(c.) 
Timothy contends that the court erred in (1) denying his 
motion to suppress evidence of his confession to law enforcement 
agents and (2) failing to grant a mistrial based on Addam's 
responses during cross-examination. 
Timothy contends that the court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress his confession. 
As set forth, supra, following his arrest, Timothy was 
transported from the Singer property to Salt Lake City. At the 
outset of the trip, Timothy was advised of his Miranda rights. 
Thereafter, he signed a waiver of rights form and began answering 
questions about the bombing. Within a short period of time, 
however, Timothy related to the agents that he did not feel like 
talking about the bombing further. All discussion ceased for 
thirty to sixty seconds. Then one of the agents indicated that 
the siege had been very stressful for him and that he wanted to 
get back to his family in Texas. Timothy expressed surprise that 
that some of the agents were from out of state. He also related 
that the siege had been a long ordeal for himself and his family. 
Subsequent thereto, Timothy agreed to describe the background 
leading up to the bombing. 
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Once Timothy arrived at the United States Marshall's office, 
he was reminded of his Miranda rights. Thereafter Timothy gave a 
detailed confession which was tape recorded. Prior to trial, 
Timothy moved to suppress his confession. During a motion hearing 
Timothy testified, inter alia, that: he had been confined to a 
wheelchair since he was seventeen when a tree fell on him; he was 
removed from public schools when he was five and thereafter 
educated by his mother and father at home; his father was shot and 
killed during an attempted arrest; he had no prior experience or 
education in relation to criminal law; he was angry and upset at 
the time of his arrest; and he did not understand his Miranda 
rights and did not realize that his statements could be used 
against him. 
Michael DeCaria, a psychologist, testified that: he had 
examined Timothy; as a result of his interview, tests, and 
examinations, he had concluded that Timothy was very susceptible 
to coercion; Timothy was unable to make decisions based on 
rational intellect; Timothy was unable to excercise his own free 
will; and Timothy would have been unable to make a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. 
The government presented the testimony of the agents who had 
transported Timothy to Salt Lake City along with the testimony of 
Doris Read, a clinical psychologist who had examined Timothy. 
Read testified, contrary to DeCaria, that there was no evidence to 
suggest that Timothy was unable to comprehend the warnings that he 
had received from the agents. Read also testified that Timothy 
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had told her that he had read and understood the Miranda form 
which he signed. 
In denying Timothy's motion to suppress, the court found: 
Now, John Timothy Singer's motion to suppress . . . 
Examining the testimony again of those who had 
physical custody of him, there's no question as to the 
event of the Mirandizing, the execution of the document, 
the subsequent reminding. There were other questions 
raised, but I after looking at all of the material and 
examining the material that's been furnished to the 
court in all of its forms, and in listening as well as 
observing that material, I'm of the opinion that I 
should deny the motion . . . . 
* * * 
I'm perfectly satisfied that they [agents] were 
very, very careful. That they were careful on the 
manner in which they proceeded. I was impressed with 
that. I'm also satisfied that there was good 
understanding that what was done was knowingly done and 
voluntarily done with good understanding. And I had 
some concerns in that area, but I've satisfied myself. 
(R., Vol. IX at p. 525). 
Timothy contends that his confession was involuntary and was 
not the product of his free and unrestrained choice. Timothy argues 
that his confession should not have been admitted when, as here, the 
agents failed to honor his assertion of his privilege against self-
incrimination, and that he is entitled to a new trial. 
A confession is admissible only if it is voluntarily made. 
If a confession is the product of "an essentially free and 
unrestrained choice by its maker . . . if he has willed to confess, 
it may be used against him". Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 
602 (1961). The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness 
not be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony; the test is 
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free 
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will of the witness was overborne. United States v. Washington, 431 
U.S. 181, 187 (1977). Furthermore, once an accused in police 
custody terminates his interview, further interrogation should not 
take place "unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police" or 
unless the "suspect himself initiates dialogue with the 
authorities." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983), 
quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) and Wyrick v. 
Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982). 
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 
court's findings of fact must be accepted unless they are clearly 
erroneous. United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d 821-22 (10th Cir. 
1986), citing United States v. Leach, 749 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1984). 
Evidence deduced at the suppression hearing must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the government. Id. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, we hold that the district court's findings in support of 
its denial of Timothy's motion to suppress were not clearly 
erroneous. Although the evidence was conflicting, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the district court could find, as it 
did, that Timothy's confession was knowingly and voluntarily made 
with an understanding of the effect of the confession. 
(ii.) 
Timothy contends that the court erred in failing to grant a 
mistrial based on Addam's responses during cross-examination. This 
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contention is identical to Jonathan's third allegation of error, 
(b)(iii), supra. 
During Addam's cross-examination, he was asked several 
questions relative to Jonathan's and Timothy's actions during the 
siege. (R., Vol. XIV, pp. 1913, 1915-16). In each instance, Addam 
declined to answer and suggested that the prosecutor "ask him," 
referring to Jonathan and/or Timothy. Timothy argues that these 
comments constituted a negative comment on the exercise of his 
constitutional right not to testify and that his conviction should 
be reversed. 
We hold that Addams's responses did not constitute an 
improper comment on Timothy's decision not to testify. See (b)(iii), 
supra. 
Cross-Appeal 
The government contends that the district court erred in not 
sentencing Addam to a five year term under Count II in accordance 
with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We agree. 
Addam was convicted on seven counts, including Count I, 
knowingly and maliciously damaging and attempting to damage a 
building with an explosive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and 
(ii), and Count II, use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in relation 
to Count I, in violaton of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). § 924(c)(1) 
provides in part: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence 
. for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the 
United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of 
violence...be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the 
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sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this 
subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed 
under this subsection run concurrently with any other 
term of imprisonment including that imposed for the 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the 
firearm was used or carried. (emphasis supplied). 
Notwithstanding Addamfs convictions under both Counts I and 
II , the district court determined that Addam should only be 
sentenced under Count I for violation of § 844(i) and (ii)» In 
finding that Addam should not be sentenced under Count II for 
violation of § 924(c)(1) the district court found, inter alia: 
It is fundamental that a defendant may only be 
convicted of two separate offenses arising from a single 
act if each offense requires proof of a fact not 
essential to the other . . . . In the original 
sentencing the court imposed a sentence of five years as 
to Count I and stayed sentence as to Count II on the 
grounds that to sentence on Count II would be unlawfully 
cumulative or duplicative of the sentence imposed on 
Count I. It seemed to the court inappropriate at the 
time of the original sentencing to sentence twice on the 
same event, supported by identical proof. It seems even 
more inappropriate now . . . where the pleadings as 
written require the same proof—where one is to be 
punished for destroying a building through the use of a 
bomb and then further punished for destroying the same 
building through the use of the same bomb—to sentence 
on both counts is unlawfully cumulative. To do so would 
impose double punishment. 
(R., Supp. Vol. I, Tab 456, p. 5). 
It is uncontested that, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), the 
explosive used to bomb the stake house was a "firearm" and that the 
bombing of the stake house constituted an "act of violence." 
The government argues that the language and intent of § 
924(c) is clear and unmistakable, i.e., a mandatory five year 
imprisonment term without the possibility of parole for anyone who 
uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
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violence. The government argues, quoting United States v. 
Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1316 (10th Cir. 1987), that § 924(c) and its 
legislative history "indicate that a sentence for violation of § 
924(c) should never run concurrently with any other sentence." The 
government also argues that sentencing Addam under § 924(c) will 
not violate the double jeopardy clause as interpreted in 
Blockburaer v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (defendant may 
not be punished twice for the same offense) when, as here, Congress 
has specifically authorized cumulative punishment. 
Addam responds that the court did not err in refusing to 
sentence him under Count II when the same evidence was introduced 
for both counts. Addam argues that, under Blockburaer, the double 
jeopardy clause is violated if a defendant is sentenced for two 
offenses predicated on the same facts; such is the situation in the 
case at bar inasmuch as there is no added fact or element differing 
Count I and Count II; and under the rule of lenity, the district 
court should be afforded the discretion to defer a cumulative 
sentence. 
We hold that the court erred in failing to sentence Addam 
under § 924(c) following his conviction of Count II. A sentence 
under § 924(c) is not discretionary; "[a defendant] shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . 
be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . " See United 
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d at p. 1315. Nor does the imposition of 
a five-year sentence under § 924(c) violate the double jeopardy 
clause as interpreted in Blockburaer. 
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In Blockburqer, the Court held that multiple punishments can 
not be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same criminal 
transaction unless each offense requires proof of a fact that the 
other does not. 
Blockburqer was clarified in Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 691-693 (1980) in which the Court held: 
The assumption underlying the rule [in Blockburqer1 
is that Congress does not intend to punish the same 
offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, 
where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same 
offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumulative 
punishments in the absence of a clear indication of 
contrary legislative intent. 
• * * 
[w]here the offenses are the same...cumulative sentences 
are not permitted unless elsewhere specifically 
authorized by Congress, (emphasis added). 
Blockburqer was further clarified in Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) in which the court noted that 
inasmuch as the "Blockburqer test is a 'rule of statutory 
construction,' and because it is serves as a means of discerning 
congressional purpose, the rule should not be controlling where, for 
example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 
Albernaz and Whalen were cited with approval in Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 368-369 (1983) in which the Court held: 
Where, as here, a legislature specifically 
authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, 
regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the 
'same' conduct under Blockburqer, a court's task of 
statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor 
may seek and the trial court or jury may impose 
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single 
trial. 
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Inasmuch as Congress specifically directed cumulative 
punishment under § 924(c), the district court was, following Addam's 
conviction under Count II, obligated to sentence him to an additional 
five years imprisonment, without probation, to run consecutively with 
his other terms of imprisonment. 
The convictions of Addam Swapp, Jonathan Swapp, and Timothy 
Singer are AFFIRMED. The case of Addam Swapp is REMANDED for further 
sentencing pursuant to § 924(c)(1). 
Entered for the Court: 
James E. Barrett, 
Senior United States 
Circuit Judge 
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